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A crucial feature in the history of anti-colonial 
and anti-apartheid struggles in South Africa 
was the role of youth-led movements and 
protests. Organised youth protests against 
government policies date as far back as the 
early 1920s.1 At its height, waves of iconic 
student protests in the mid-70s highlighted 
the role of young people in opposing apartheid 
policies.2 By the same token, the repressive 
response of the state to youth protests, 
including mass arrests of children, laid bare the 
violence of the apartheid regime and became 
the focus of international condemnation.3
Despite the historical and ongoing importance of protest as a vehicle for children to express 
themselves, current laws fail to protect and enable children’s participation in protest. More than two 
decades after the formal end of apartheid, a child may be subject to criminal processes for 
convening a peaceful, unarmed protest. This article highlights the importance of the right to protest 
for children and the obligation on the state to respect, protect and fulfil the right to protest, 
specifically taking into account children’s interests. Through a description of the Mlungwana & 
Others vs The State and Others case, the article highlights the manner in which the criminalisation of 
peaceful protest by the Regulation of Gatherings Act fails to take into account the best interests of 
children and violates the right to protest. 
More than two decades after the formal end 
of apartheid, youth-led protests and youth 
participation in protests continue to play 
an important role in South Africa’s political 
landscape. Young people have engaged in 
protest as a vehicle of expression over the past 
two decades in various contexts and through 
multiple modes. Whether spontaneous or 
organised, children use protest as a means to 
raise awareness and call attention to issues 
impacting their daily life. These can range from 
marches in urban centres4 and pickets outside 
legislatures,5 to creative forms of demonstration, 
including art and film.6 Indeed, albeit contested, 
the national imagination has at times been 
captured by the symbolism of youth-led 
demonstrations. In 2016 iconic images were 
shared across the country of young women in 
school uniforms, arms crossed and held up, 
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facing off against school officials and carrying 
slogans such as ‘Fists Up, Fros Out’.7 Through 
protests such as these, young people have 
given expression to broader sentiments around, 
among others, racial injustice and economic 
exclusion. While cautious of romanticisation, it 
is indisputable that children have shaped South 
Africa’s political landscape through protest in 
profound ways, and continue to do so.
Despite the historical and current importance 
of protest as a vehicle for children to express 
themselves, the legal framework regulating 
protest fails to sufficiently respect, protect 
and enable children’s participation in protest. 
Indeed, as will be argued here, the current legal 
framework unduly limits and chills the exercise 
of free assembly and political expression 
through draconian and inflexible measures, 
which are particularly burdensome for children. 
Before turning to the national legislation 
regulating protest, it is necessary to outline the 
importance of the right to protest for children 
and how it is recognised in the South African 
Constitution, as well as in international law.
Importance of protecting the 
right to protest for children
Freedom of assembly is vital in democratic 
societies. The right to protest has been 
described – alongside the right to vote – as 
a route ‘by which ideas can be promoted 
and debated’.8 The Constitutional Court has 
specifically emphasised the role of freedom of 
assembly in enhancing the voice of the most 
vulnerable and powerless:
[T]he right to freedom of assembly is 
central to our constitutional democracy. 
It exists primarily to give a voice to the 
powerless. This includes groups that do 
not have political or economic power, and 
other vulnerable persons. It provides an 
outlet for their frustrations. This right will, 
in many cases, be the only mechanism 
available to them to express their 
legitimate concerns.9 
For children, who are a particularly vulnerable 
group and not legally entitled to vote, protest 
becomes an even more significant avenue 
through which to participate and be heard in 
social and political life. It is thus important to 
emphasise that constitutional and international 
law protections of the right to protest and 
free expression are not the preserve of adults, 
but also extend to children.10 Indeed, the 
paramountcy of the ‘best interests of the child’ 
in all matters concerning children is specifically 
required by the Constitution.11 As explained by 
the Constitutional Court, the best interests of 
the child standard must be used to test laws or 
conduct that affect children.12 In S v M,13 Justice 
Albie Sachs put it such:
The comprehensive and emphatic 
language of section 28 indicates that just 
as law enforcement must always be 
gender-sensitive, so must it always 
be child-sensitive; that statutes must 
be interpreted and the common law 
developed in a manner which favours 
protecting and advancing the interests of 
children.14 (Emphasis added)
Consequently, laws or conduct that regulate 
the right to protest must also be child-sensitive 
and developed in a manner that protects and 
advances the interests of children. Furthermore, 
an important component of the best interests 
of the child principle is the recognition of the 
need to protect children’s participation rights. In 
this regard, international law frameworks have 
highlighted the special obligation on states to 
ensure that the right of a child to be heard is 
respected, protected and fulfilled.15 National 
legislation has also recognised the right of 
children to participate in matters concerning 
them.16 As Daly notes, the evolution of children’s 
participation rights has developed alongside 
broadened conceptions of citizenship, where 
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children are increasingly recognised as ‘the 
human beings they are in the present’ and not 
simply as ‘future adults’.17 In relation to the right 
to protest, Daly argues that this necessitates 
that children ‘should be seen as a group with as 
much interest in protest as adults, but one with 
particular needs that must be met to allow them 
to exercise the right’.18 
Despite the robust constitutional and 
international law protections for children’s right 
to participation, expression and protest, 
current laws in South Africa fail to adequately 
protect and enable the right to protest for 
children. As explained below, children holding 
an entirely peaceful protest may – under the 
current regulatory framework – be subject to 
criminal sanction.
South African law fails to respect and 
fulfil the right to protest of children 
The state has an obligation to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the exercise of the right to 
protest by all persons – including children.19 This 
entails negative and positive obligations. The 
current legislative framework fails on both fronts.
The Regulation of Gatherings Act20 regulates 
the exercise of the right to protest in South 
Africa. The Act affirms the right of everyone to 
peaceful assembly and protest, and puts in 
place procedures and mechanisms that are 
arguably aimed at facilitating the exercise of 
the right. These procedures are far from child-
friendly. Navigating the difficult and intimidating 
bureaucracy of, among others, notification 
procedures21 and meetings with officials22 is 
straining for adults, let alone for children. Yet, 
there are no specific child-friendly provisions 
within the Gatherings Act that require officials to 
take into account the needs and best interests 
of children. 
Moreover, not only does the legislative framework 
fail to provide for special measures in order 
to positively protect the right to protest of 
children, but it is arguable that the overly 
broad provisions of the Gatherings Act, which 
criminalise peaceful protest unreasonably and 
unjustifiably, infringe the right to protest. In this 
regard, section 12 of the Gatherings Act creates 
an array of offences for breaching administrative 
requirements of the Act. These include, among 
others, criminal liability for failure to provide 
notice of a gathering;23 failure to attend a 
meeting called by an official to negotiate the 
terms of a proposed protest;24 and failure to 
notify relevant officials of the postponement or 
cancellation of a protest.25 It bears emphasis 
that criminal liability is not only applicable when 
harm or the reasonable apprehension of harm 
has occurred. Rather, the pain of criminal 
sanction can attach for mere failure to comply 
with bureaucratic procedures, even where 
a gathering has taken place peacefully and 
without incident. This applies to adults and 
children. Consequently, more than two decades 
after the formal end of apartheid, a child may 
be subject to criminal processes for leading an 
entirely peaceful, unarmed protest.  
The constitutionality of criminalising protest 
for the mere failure to meet administrative 
requirements is now being tested in South 
African courts. Mlungwana & Others vs The 
State and Others (case no. A431/15) (‘the 
SJC10 case’), which was heard by the Cape 
High Court in June 2017, is one such case. 
The appellants – members of the Cape Town 
based Social Justice Coalition (SJC) – convened 
a protest outside the offices of the mayor 
of Cape Town in 2013. The protest, which 
included activists chaining themselves to the 
railings outside the offices, was a deliberate 
act of civil disobedience.26 It was common 
cause that the activists had chosen not to 
notify relevant officials of the intended protest 
and had initially intended for the protest to 
remain under 15 people.27 It was also common 
cause that the protest remained non-violent.28 
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Nevertheless, during the course of the assembly 
the total number of participants increased to 
more than 15 persons, and consequently the 
activists were arrested. Ten individuals were 
ultimately convicted under section 12(1)(a) of 
the Gatherings Act, which stipulates that it 
is a criminal offence to convene a protest of 
more than 15 people without having given prior 
notice of the intended protest.29 The appellants 
challenged the constitutionality of the offence, 
arguing that to the extent that compliance 
with the notification procedure is sought, less 
restrictive measures can be applied before 
resorting to criminalisation. The appellants noted 
that there are existing sanctions imposed by the 
Gatherings Act and common law that impose 
liability when actual harm is caused as a result 
of protest action. In addition, the appellants 
pointed to measures such as enhanced civil 
liability and administrative fines that could be 
imposed as an alternative to criminalisation.
In submissions made as a friend of the court, 
Equal Education (EE), a social movement 
composed primarily of high school learners 
called ‘Equalisers’, argued that the impact of 
criminalisation on children should be considered 
when testing the constitutionality of the 
relevant provisions.30 EE emphasised that the 
offence created by the Act also makes children 
vulnerable to criminal justice processes when 
exercising their right to protest. Such a harsh 
approach, EE submitted, does not adequately 
take into account the position of children. As 
submitted by EE:
Understandably, children, such as the 
Equaliser members of EE, are unlikely to – 
by themselves – have access to resources 
and practical means to fulfil the written 
notice requirement. It is not unsurprising 
then for gatherings organised by or 
amongst children to fail to meet the notice 
requirement. These children face the 
threat of their conduct being criminalised 
under the impugned provision and could be 
subjected to the criminal justice system.31  
EE further noted that even though the Child 
Justice Act32 does aim to establish a more 
child-sensitive regime for children in conflict with 
the law, this does not sufficiently counter the 
chilling effect of peaceful protest action being 
criminalised.33 Categorised as a Schedule 2 
offence under the Child Justice Act, alongside 
arson, housebreaking and assault with intent to 
do grievous bodily harm, a child is susceptible 
to arrest for contravening section 12(1)(a) of the 
Gatherings Act. Even though there is a possibility 
of diversion under the Act, this falls within 
prosecutorial discretion and is not guaranteed.34 
Where a diversion order is made, a register of 
the child’s offence and the diversion order is 
maintained.35 In cases where diversion is not 
granted, a criminal record may apply. Thus, even 
with the protections of the Child Justice Act, a 
child may be arrested, exposed to criminal justice 
processes, and obtain a criminal or diversion 
record for the mere failure to provide notice of a 
protest. As expressed in EE’s submission:
It is striking that in our constitutional 
democracy, political expression of children 
in the form of a peaceful gathering can, 
for mere failure of meeting a procedural 
requirement, be considered as a criminal 
offence at all, let alone an offence within 
the same category of seriousness as arson 
and housebreaking.36 
EE went on to highlight that the harsh penalty of 
criminalisation for exercising the right to protest 
sits uncomfortably with international law, which 
indicates that subjecting children to criminal 
justice processes should be a measure of last 
resort.37 The Constitutional Court has confirmed 
that detention of children should be a measure 
of last resort38 and has emphasised that children 
should be protected against avoidable trauma.39 
This is not merely academic. Reports of children 
threatened with arrest and forceful measures 
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while engaged in peaceful protest action are not 
uncommon.40 Authorised by legislation to use 
the threat of criminal sanction when seeking 
to disperse a protest, officials and police who 
have not been trained otherwise rely on it – even 
when children are involved.
At the time of writing, judgment had yet to 
be handed down in the SJC10 case. The 
matter will ultimately require the attention 
of the Constitutional Court. The court’s 
pronouncement will have significant implications 
for the exercise of the right to protest for all 
persons, including children. 
Conclusion 
In light of the history of youth protest and 
struggle in South Africa, it is concerning that the 
protection of the right to protest for children, as 
a special interest group with particular needs, 
has not received considered attention. While the 
removal of criminal sanctions is an important 
step, further measures are required to properly 
protect and fulfil children’s exercise of their right 
to protest. Such measures may include training 
officials and police in managing protests led by 
or involving children, so as to be respectful of 
their autonomy and rights but also protective of 
their particular needs and vulnerabilities. It may 
also include revised administrative requirements 
that are aimed at facilitating the right to protest 
for children, rather than serving as a barrier. For 
children’s rights advocates, academics and legal 
practitioners, current challenges to legislation 
and practices present an important opportunity 
to highlight the perspective of children and to 
develop models for child-friendly frameworks, 
which may better serve our children – the future 
of our democracy. 
To comment on this article visit 
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